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Abstract
Modern cell phones are required to receive and display alerts 
via the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) program, under the 
mandate of the Warning, Alert, and Response Act of 2006. 
These alerts include AMBER alerts, severe weather alerts, 
and (unblockable) Presidential Alerts, intended to inform 
the public of imminent threats. Recently, a test Presidential 
Alert was sent to all capable phones in the U.S., prompting 
concerns about how the underlying WEA protocol could 
be misused or attacked. In this paper, we investigate the 
details of this system and develop and demonstrate the 
first practical spoofing attack on Presidential Alerts, using 
commercially available hardware and modified open source 
software. Our attack can be performed using a commer-
cially available software-defined radio, and our modifica-
tions to the open source software libraries. We find that with 
only four malicious portable base stations of a single Watt 
of transmit power each, almost all of a 50,000-seat stadium 
can be attacked with a 90% success rate. The real impact of 
such an attack would, of course, depend on the density of 
cellphones in range; fake alerts in crowded cities or stadi-
ums could potentially result in cascades of panic. Fixing this 
problem will require a large collaborative effort between 
carriers, government stakeholders, and cellphone manufac-
turers. To seed this effort, we also propose three mitigation 
solutions to address this threat.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) program is a gov-
ernment mandated service in commercialized cellular 
networks in the U.S. WEA was established by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in response to the 
Warning, Alert, and Response Act of 2006 to allow wireless 
cellular service providers to send geographically targeted 
emergency alerts to their subscribers. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for the imple-
mentation and administration of a major component of WEA.
This system can send three types of alerts: Presidential 
Alerts issued by the president to all of the United States; 
Imminent Threat Alerts involving serious threats to life and 
property, often related to severe weather; and AMBER Alerts 
regarding missing or abducted children. Considering the 
number of cellphone users and the nationwide coverage 
of cellular networks, WEA over Long-Term Evolution (LTE) 
was a natural step to enhance public safety immediately and 
effectively. In fact, recent rapidly moving fires have caused 
emergency services to consider using WEA instead of relying 
on opt-in alerting systems.16
A handful of widely publicized events has led to public 
scrutiny over the potential misuse of the alert system. On 
The original version of this paper is entitled “This is 
Your President Speaking: Spoofing Alerts in 4G LTE 
Networks” and was published in Proceedings of the 
17th ACM International Conference on Mobile Systems, 
Applications and Services, 2019.
January 13, 2018, there was a geographically targeted alert 
issued in Hawaii. The message, warning of an inbound mis-
sile, is shown in Figure 1b. Although caused by human error, 
the impact on the residents of Hawaii was huge, as it led to 
panic and disruption throughout the state.20 This event was 
followed on October 3, 2018, by the first national test of a 
mandatory Presidential Alert. The alert, captured in Figure 1a, 
was sent to all capable phones in the U.S.19
These recent high-profile alerts have prompted us to 
assess the realizability and impact of an alert spoofing attack. 
In this paper, we demonstrate how to launch a Presidential 
Alert-spoofing attack and evaluate its effectiveness with 
respect to attack coverage and success rate.
To answer this question, we start by looking into the alert 
delivery method used by WEA. WEA sends alerts via the com-
mercial mobile alert service (CMAS), which is the underly-
ing delivery technology standardized by the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP). These alerts are delivered via 
the LTE downlink within broadcast messages, called System 
Information Block (SIB) messages. A celltower (referred to as 
eNodeB) broadcasts the SIB to every cell phone (referred to 
as user equipment or UE) that is tuned to the control chan-
nels of that eNodeB. A UE obtains necessary access informa-
tion, such as the network identifier and access restrictions, 
from SIB messages, and uses it for the eNodeB selection 
procedure. Among the 26 different types of SIB messages, 
SIB12 contains the CMAS notification, which delivers the 
aforementioned alert messages to the UEs.
The eNodeB broadcasts SIB messages to the UE, inde-
pendently from the mutual authentication procedure that 
(a) Presidential alert (b) Imminent threat alert
Figure 1. Snapshots of real WEA messages received by cellphones: 
(a) the first national test of the Presidential Alert performed on 




86    COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM   |   OCTOBER 2021  |   VOL.  64  |   NO.  10
providers AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Sprint, and U.S. Cellular; 
and the manufacturers Apple, Google, and Samsung.
2. SECURITY THREATS
The 3GPP standardization body began a project in 2006 to 
define the requirements of CMAS to deliver WEA messages 
in the LTE network, and the LTE CMAS network architecture 
is illustrated in Figure 2. The resulting technical specifica-
tion, initially released in 2009, describes the general criteria 
for the delivery of alerts, message formats, and functional-
ity of CMAS-capable UEs.2 During an emergency, autho-
rized public safety officials send alert messages to Federal 
Alert Gateways. The participating mobile service providers 
then broadcast the alert to the UEs, who will automatically 
receive the alert if they are located in or travel to the targeted 
geographic area. The cell broadcast center (CBC) is part of 
the service provider’s core network and is connected to the 
Mobility Management Entity (MME), which maintains the 
location information of the UEs attached to the network.3 
The eNodeB is the final step in communicating the alert to 
the UEs over the air.
UEs may choose to turn off the notification of immi-
nent threat alerts and AMBER alerts among the three 
types of emergency alerts (i.e., presidential alerts, immi-
nent threat alerts, and AMBER alerts). However, the 3GPP 
mandated that the reception of Presidential Alerts is 
obligatory. Thus, cell phones have no option to disable 
Presidential Alerts, as seen in Figure 3. Because it cannot 
be disabled, this paper focuses on spoofing Presidential 
Alerts with the injection of a fake CMAS message over the 
air from a rogue eNodeB.
2.1. Identifying the vulnerability
An eNodeB broadcasts LTE system information through the 
Master Information Block (MIB) and SIB. Specifically, when 
a LTE searches for an eNodeB, it searches for the eNodeB’s 
physical cell identifier (PCI) within a dedicated synchroni-
zation channel specified by the LTE standard.5 After find-
ing the PCI, the LTE unscrambles the MIB, which contains 
essential information such as the system bandwidth, sys-
tem frame number (SFN), and the antenna configuration, 
to decode the SIB Type 1 message (SIB1). There are several 
SIB messages but only SIB1 has a fixed periodicity of 80 
eventually occurs between them. Thus, all SIBs, such as 
CMAS, are intrinsically vulnerable to spoofing from a mali-
cious eNodeB. More importantly, even if the UE has com-
pleted its authentication and securely communicates with 
a trusted eNodeB, the UE is still exposed to the security 
threat caused by the broadcasts from other, possibly mali-
cious, eNodeBs. This is because the UE periodically gathers 
SIB information from neighboring eNodeBs for potential 
eNodeB (re)selection and handover.
We found via both experiment and simulation that a 
90% success rate can be reached in 4435 m2 of a 16,859 m2 
building using a single malicious eNodeB of 0.1 Watt 
power, whereas in an outdoor stadium, 49,300 seats 
among the total 50,000 are hit with an attack, which itself 
has a 90% success rate using four malicious eNodeBs of 1 
Watt power.
In summary, we make following major contributions:
• We identify security vulnerabilities of the WEA system 
and explain the detailed underlying mechanism stipu-
lated by the LTE standard. We find that the CMAS spoof-
ing attack is easy to perform but is challenging to 
defend in practice.
• We present our threat analysis on the CMAS spoofing 
attack and implement an effective attack system using 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software-defined 
radio (SDR) hardware and open-source LTE software.
• We evaluate our attack system using both SDR-based 
hardware prototype and measurement-based simula-
tion. As one of the striking results, we demonstrate that 
four SDR-based malicious eNodeBs at 1 Watt of power 
can propagate their signal to 49,300 of the whole 50,000-
seat football stadium. Of the 49,300 seats affected, 90% 
will receive the CMAS message.
• We present possible solutions to prevent such a spoof-
ing attack with a thorough analysis and feasibility test, 
which can open the door toward collaborative efforts 
between cellular operators, government stakeholders, 
and phone manufacturers.
1.1. Responsible disclosure
In January 2019, before public release, we disclosed the dis-
coveries and technical details of this alert spoofing attack 
to various pertinent parties. These parties include the gov-
ernment and standardization organizations FEMA, FCC, 


























Figure 2. LTE CMAS network architecture.
(a) Android alert setting (b) iPhone alert setting
Figure 3. Government alert settings in mobile phones: (a) Android 
and (b) Apple’s iPhones. Although AMBER and emergency alerts can 
be manually disabled, users cannot disable or block Presidential 
Alerts from being received or displayed.
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msec. Other SIB messages are dynamically scheduled by the 
eNodeB, and the scheduling information for other SIBs is 
encoded in the periodic SIB1.
3GPP specifies that the broadcast of CMAS messages is 
over the air through SIB12.6 However, unlike point-to-point 
messages in LTE, broadcasts of SIB messages are not pro-
tected by mutual cryptographic authentication or confiden-
tiality, because the SIB contains essential information the 
UEs use to access the network before any session keys have 
been established. Once a CMAS message has been received, 
there is no verification method for the message content. If 
an attacker can imitate eNodeB behavior closely enough to 
broadcast false CMAS messages, the UE will display them.
A UE’s vulnerability to a fake CMAS alert depends on 
whether it is in an active or idle state, illustrated in Figure 4. 
To affect the most UEs, an attacker must consider differ-
ent approaches for each state. Here we discuss idle UEs and 
active UEs separately:
Idle mode UEs. Reference Signal Received Power (RSRP) 
is the power of an eNodeB-specific reference signal recog-
nized by the UE, typically used to make an eNodeB selection 
and handover decision. Usually, whenever a UE in idle mode 
performs eNodeB selection (or reselection), it will associate 
with the eNodeB having the highest RSRP. If the RSRP of a 
malicious eNodeB is the strongest, the UE decodes the SIBs 
transmitted by the malicious eNodeB. The attacker does not 
need to have any user information (such as security keys), 
which would be stored in the network operator’s database. 
Without having such user information, the UE will eventu-
ally reject the authentication process with the malicious 
eNodeB. However, it can receive a CMAS message transmit-
ted by the malicious eNodeB during this process.
Active mode UEs. When a UE is in active mode, it securely 
communicates with the serving eNodeB. If it finds another 
eNodeB with a higher power level than the existing serving 
eNodeB, a handover procedure can be triggered. The serv-
ing eNodeB then makes a handover decision based on the 
received measurement report. However, if the serving MME 
does not identify the target eNodeB, the handover will even-
tually fail. Therefore, even if caused by a malicious eNodeB, 
the handover procedure does not make a UE vulnerable to the 
CMAS spoofing attack. As a consequence, the attacker first 
needs to disconnect the UE from its serving eNodeB. After 
the UE is released from the serving eNodeB, it will immedi-
ately try to attach to the strongest eNodeB. After that, it can 
be attacked in the same way as idle mode UEs described in 
the section above. One way to disconnect the active UE from 
its serving eNodeB is to incur Radio Link Failures (RLFs) by 
jamming LTE signals.15 Simply, without any special jamming 
technique, a malicious eNodeB can jam the communication 
between a UE and its serving eNodeB by merely transmitting 
at a much higher power than the serving eNodeB.
2.2. CMAS reception and trustworthiness
We have identified three possible cases that determine 
whether the CMAS is received and is trustworthy in Table 1. 
Each case depends on where the UE is currently in the idle/
active life cycle, illustrated in Figure 4.
Simply put, if a UE is not listening to frequency channels 
on which the eNodeB is transmitting the CMAS message, the 
CMAS message will not be received by the UE. This is illus-
trated as the blue portion in Figure 4. It may seem obvious, 
but a necessary condition for the UE to receive a CMAS mes-
sage is that it needs to be tuned to the synchronization chan-
nels of the eNodeB that is transmitting the CMAS message.
Secure CMAS. In the green area of Figure 4, the UE attaches 
to an eNodeB and is safely in the active state. To do this, the 
UE must be equipped with a valid Service Identity Module 
(SIM) card that is registered to the operator’s network. Case 1 
is the general scenario for phones receiving standard service 
from their provider. Because mutual authentication between 
the UE and the network has been successfully made, the UE 
can trust that the eNodeB is not malicious. The CMAS recep-
tion is successful as we would expect, and we know that this 
CMAS message is trustworthy.
Unsecured CMAS. In the red area of Figure 4, the UE is 
failing or has already failed to attach when the eNodeB trans-
mits the CMAS message. The UE will still receive the CMAS 
message; this is the crux of the vulnerability. To demonstrate 
this, we deleted the SIM information from the Evolved Packet 
Core (EPC) so that the user authentication would be unsuc-
cessful. The UE is now in the unsecured range between the 
idle and active states due to the authentication failure. Even 
though the UE fails to reach the active state, we observe 
that the CMAS message is still successfully received. This is 
because once the UE completes decoding the CMAS message 
in SIB12, it delivers the contents to the application layer to 



















Figure 4. The Idle/Active life cycle of a UE. The state of the UE 
continues counterclockwise around the chart. CMAS spoofing is 
possible although the UE performs an eNodeB search, prior to 








1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Yes No Yes No
3 No No Yes No
Table 1. Cases for CMAS reception and trustworthiness.
research highlights 
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the authentication process has finally failed. Case 2 can lead 
the potential threat that any malicious eNodeB can deliver fake 
CMAS messages although the UE is in between the eNodeB search 
and authentication procedures. Finally, in Case 3, the UE roams 
to an eNodeB, which sends a CMAS message. To demonstrate 
this, we removed the SIM card from the UE. No authentication 
is possible, but the UE can make emergency calls such as 911. 
Even in this situation, we verified that the UE still receives the 
CMAS message, which is potentially malicious.
As shown in Cases 2 and 3, CMAS spoofing can be done 
although the UE performs an eNodeB search before success-
ful authentication with a trusted eNodeB. These results are 
verified using 1 × JL620 COTS LTE small cell (no modifica-
tion), 1 × open-source NextEPC (modified with the CBC),17 
and nine different commercial LTE phones (Apple iPhone 8, 
X, and XS; Google Pixel 1; Huawei Nexus 6P; Motorola G5 
Plus and G6; Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge and S8). Considering 
that the majority of UEs in cellular networks are in the idle 
state10 and UEs often transition from the active to idle state 
due to an inactivity timer (around 10 s13), almost all UEs are 
susceptible to this attack.
3. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT ATTACKS
In this section, we present the details of our Presidential 
Alert Spoofer system and describe how it works. Our system 
can be built with either an SDR device or a COTS eNodeB, 
and the list of hardware and software systems we used is 
summarized in Table 2.
Attack preparation. Our Presidential Alert Spoofer must 
first identify the existing eNodeBs in a given licensed fre-
quency band. Each eNodeB can be uniquely identified at a 
given geographical position by the pair of “E-UTRA Absolute 
Radio Frequency Channel Number (EARFCN)” and “Physical 
Cell ID (PCI).” For each EARFCN, our Spoofer finds the eNo-
deB, and associated PCI, of which the RSRP is the strongest. 
Once the existing eNodeBs are listed, the Public Land Mobile 
Network (PLMN) information of each eNodeB is collected. 
Every LTE network has its PLMN, a three-digit country code, 
and two or three digits to identify the provider. The PLMN is 
periodically broadcast by the eNodeB in the SIB1 message, 
making it possible to collect all of the observable PLMNs 
within the receiving range passively. To launch an attack, 
our Presidential Alert Spoofer uses the same PLMN as an 
existing eNodeB such that the UEs will select our Spoofer 
during an eNodeB search.
System Hardware Software














Table 2. HW and SW systems used for implementation.
Figure 5. The Presidential Alert Spoofer scans for an eNodeB, 
gathers operator information, and sends a fake Presidential Alert 
to both idle and active UEs. The UEs may be FDD or TDD. This setup 









Figure 6. Receiving multiple fake Presidential Alerts using a 
Samsung Galaxy S8(left) and an Apple iPhone X(right).
Attack execution with an SDR device. We implemented 
the Spoofer using a USRP B210 and BladeRF to attack 
Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) systems. With an SDR, we 
can change the transmission frequency easily to target every 
cellular band. We added SIB12 support to the open-source 
eNodeB software12 and could transmit a CMAS message 
every 160 msec.
Attack execution with a COTS eNodeB. We use a COTS eNo-
deB (Juni JLT-621) to target Time Division Duplex (TDD) sys-
tems. Our modification of NextEPC provides an interface to 
inject a user-defined Presidential Alert that broadcasts each 
second. With this configuration, a victim UE may receive the 
SIB12 every second from the COTS eNodeB. Any commercial 
LTE FDD/TDD eNodeB hardware can perform this attack, 
which may play a key role if an attacker wants to control mul-
tiple malicious eNodeBs in a coordinated manner.
Attack verification. In our lab environment, we veri-
fied that the fake Presidential Alert sent by our SDR-based 
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the UE to enter the idle mode due to inactivity. The Spoofer 
broadcasts each new Presidential Alert message, so we can 
determine whether each Presidential Alert is successfully 
received and at what power configuration of α or β. We con-
ducted 20 experimental trials for each value of α (or β) rang-
ing from 0 to −25 dB.
The Spoofer may elect to use a different PCI than that 
of the serving eNodeB, appearing to be a new eNodeB. Or, 
the Spoofer may use the same PCI, looking to be the exist-
ing eNodeB and interfering with the existing eNodeB’s 
PHY-layer control channel information.22 This decision has 
different impacts on the performance of the spoofing attack, 
depending on the UE state (idle or active).
Figure 8 shows the empirical cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of successful receptions of fake alerts as a 
function of q for idle UEs. When the Spoofer uses a differ-
ent PCI and the received signal strength from the Spoofer 
is higher than that from SecureNet (α < 0), the idle UE will 
consider the Spoofer as a new serving eNodeB. Our experi-
mental results verify this expectation; 50% of idle UEs can 
receive a fake message even at α = −1, and more than 90% of 
idle UEs can receive a fake message when α ≤ −6.
However, if the same PCI is used, the attack performance 
is significantly degraded. Because the PCI is used to gener-
ate cell-specific reference signals,5 using the same PCI value 
will cause channel estimation errors at the UE due to colli-
sions from the two transmitters. This, in turn, leads to more 
decoding errors when receiving the SIBs. As a result, using 
the same PCI requires much higher attack power as no UE is 
affected when a is greater than −12 dB. With α ≤ −17, 90% of 
idle UEs can still be attacked.
Figure 9 shows the CDF of successful fake message recep-
tions as a function of β (i.e., forcing disconnect) for active 
UEs. When the Spoofer uses a different PCI, and the received 
signal strength from the Spoofer is higher than that from 
the SecureNet eNodeB, the active UE will start to consider 
the Spoofer as a target eNodeB for a handover, as described 
in §2.2. Because SecureNet does not identify the Spoofer, 
a handover cannot be performed. Instead, we observed an 
RLF would occur when β ≤ −10, which eventually leads to the 
Spoofer was successfully shown in the FDD phones of 
AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon. With a TDD Sprint phone, 
we verified that our COTS eNodeB-based Spoofer also 
works successfully. All the experiments are carried out 
with proper RF shielding.
Affected devices and implications. From discussions 
of the SIB12 vulnerability in §2.1, it became clear that 
the lack of authentication was a design choice by 3GPP, 
rather than an oversight. This design provides the best 
possible coverage for legitimate emergency alerts, but 
the trade-off leaves every phone vulnerable to spoofed 
alerts. Consequently, all modem chipsets that fully com-
ply with the 3GPP standards show the same behavior: the 
fake Presidential Alert is received without authentication. 
Once the LTE modem of the UE receives the fake alert, the 
operating system will display the alert to the user. Because 
our attack verification tests included many Android and 
iOS phones, we conclude that most (presumably all) LTE 
phones will be affected by the attack, regardless of the 
phone’s vendor or model. Moreover, much of the LTE pub-
lic warning system is inherited from 2G/3G and continues 
in 5G; a similar attack is also possible in 5G.
4. EVALUATION
Figure 7 illustrates our experimental testbed setup, which 
consists of an EPC and eNodeB for a conventional LTE sys-
tem, a malicious eNodeB for spoofing, and cell phones for 
victim UEs. A signal attenuator receives the broadcast sig-
nals from two sources and delivers the combined signal to 
a LTE in a shielded box. We built an LTE test network with 
an EPC and eNodeB, named SecureNet, which assumes the 
role of the user’s original network. On the other hand, the 
malicious eNodeB, part of the Presidential Alert Spoofer, is 
installed solely without any LTE core support. By using the 
signal attenuator, the signal power received at the LTE can 
be precisely controlled for various practical scenarios.
4.1. Success rate
Let α be the RSRP difference between the SecureNet 
eNodeB and Presidential Alert Spoofer for an idle UE (i.e., 
α = RSRPSecure Net − RSRPSpoofer) and β be the RSRP difference 
for an active UE. Then we evaluate the Presidential Alert 
Spoofer’s success rate as a function of α (or β). We first 
attach the UE to SecureNet. For the idle UE case, we wait for 
SecureNet EPC








Figure 7. The testbed setup for evaluating the attack success rate. 
The transmission power levels of the SecureNet eNodeB and the 





































Figure 8. The CDF as a function of α for only idle UEs. Because 
eNodeB reselection happens when idle UEs wake up, the spoofing 
attack performs better when using a different PCI.
research highlights 
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reception of a fake alert. About 90% of active UEs can receive 
a fake message when β ≤ −20, assuming that a different PCI 
value is used for the Spoofer. Unlike the idle UE case, using 
the same PCI value results in higher decoding errors (and 
more RLFs) at a receiver. Thus, it shows better attack perfor-
mance; 90% of receptions are successful with β ≤ −13.
4.2. Practical scenarios: indoor and outdoor
As we do not use the Spoofer outside of a shield box, we can-
not directly measure its effect on a large number of people. 
To evaluate the attack coverage according to its success rate, 
we use actual RSRP measurements in indoor and outdoor 
environments.
Indoor attack. We placed our malicious eNodeB inside a 
campus building and measured the RSRP of a dummy LTE 
signal (containing no CMAS message) in the EBS band with 
0.1 Watt transmit power. We also measured the RSRP of a 
nearby AT&T eNodeB, as shown in Figure 10a. The RSRP 
does not attenuate consistently due to various obstacles, but 
generally, the RSRP tends to decrease as the distance from 
the AT&T eNodeB increases. We compared the two RSRPs 
throughout the building and indicated the attack cover-
age using measurements obtained from §4.1, as depicted 
in Figure 10b. As a result, in a building with a total area of 
about 16,859 m2, for idle UEs, the coverage for a 90% success 
rate was about 4435 m2, whereas for active UEs, the coverage 
for a 90% success rate was about 2955 m2.
Outdoor attack. Without access to outdoor LTE equip-
ment, we simulate the RSRPs of the spoofing eNodeB and 
the AT&T eNodeB with the NS-3 v3.29 network simulator.18 
For the scenario, we assume a football game where a large 
number of people are gathered in a restricted region. A 
group of attackers sends fake alerts to the spectators inside 
the football stadium. We measured the RSRP of an actual 
AT&T eNodeB around the perimeter of our campus’ football 
stadium, as shown in Figure 11. We used the simulator to 
estimate the RSRPs at the centers of each section in the 
stadium (Figure 11a). We simulated the spoofers in four 
corners around the stadium, near but still outside of the tick-
eted area. Figure 11b shows which malicious eNodeB with 
a 1 Watt transmit power attacked each section. We observe 
that all sections, except one, are attacked by the malicious 
eNodeBs. This means that 49,300 among the total 50,000 
seats will be hit with the attack, which itself has a 90% suc-
cess rate, given that all UEs are in the idle state.
5. MITIGATION SOLUTIONS
Defending against CMAS spoofing attacks requires careful 
consideration of several challenges. First, updates to the 
CMAS architecture could require expensive changes by cell 
phone manufacturers, operating system developers, govern-
ment bodies, and cellular carriers. Coordinating such an 
effort would be difficult due to the fragmented nature of the 
network. Furthermore, updates must still support outdated 
devices, both on the user (UE) and infrastructure (eNodeB) 
side, as it could take years to replace old equipment. Also, 
any comprehensive defense must consider the trade-off 
between security and availability: if users cannot receive 






































Figure 9. The CDF as a function of β for only active UEs. Using the 
same PCI leads to more decoding errors observed by the UE. This 
results in a slightly more effective attack.




















Figure 10. The indoor attack simulation: (a) the satellite image of the Engineering Center at the University of Colorado Boulder shows the 
nearest AT&T eNodeB. The graph shows the indoor RSRP distribution of that eNodeB. (b) The attack coverage for idle and active UEs are 
shown when a 1 × 0.1 Watt malicious eNodeB is used.
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As a result, we propose a spoofing detection algorithm as 
a client-driven approach. First, it needs to have the ability to 
access a short history of RRC and NAS state transition. Then, 
whenever a CMAS message is received, it should be checked 
by our algorithm before displaying it to a user. The algo-
rithm finds any suspicious activity by evaluating RRC and 
NAS state transition, assuming that unsecured connections 
may deliver fake broadcast messages. Finally, it shows:
hazardous than the case if we continued to use the existing 
(but vulnerable) system.
With these challenges in mind, we propose three mitiga-
tion solutions: first, a client-side software solution ignoring 
unsecured CMAS alerts; second, a network-aware solution 
attempting to detect false alerts by modeling characteristics 
of legitimate eNodeBs; and third, adding digital signatures 
to alerts.
5.1. Client-driven approach
A client-driven approach should provide an ability for a UE 
to decide whether a received CMAS message is trustwor-
thy. It requires the information from LTE’s control plane, 
which is responsible for essential operations such as net-
work attaches, security control, authentication, setting up of 
bearers, and mobility management. To mitigate the CMAS 
spoofing attack, we utilize Radio Resource Control (RRC) 
and Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer information from the 
LTE control plane. We can check whether the UE has a valid 
connection or not from the RRC control information and 
the UE’s state transition with MME from the NAS control 
information.
Monitoring RRC and NAS on a UE is currently tricky 
because LTE control plane protocols are handled by the 
LTE baseband chipset and firmware so that accessing such 
information through the existing Operating System (e.g., 
Android, iOS) is not fully supported. In our implementation, 
we installed a cellular debugging tool on Android to retrieve 
the state information of RRC and NAS.14
Figure 12 shows the RRC and NAS state transition in a 
standard scenario where the UE receives a Secure CMAS mes-
sage from a legitimate eNodeB. When it receives an Unsecure 
CMAS message, we will see a different state transition. For 
instance, when a UE is in active mode, the attack starts with 
a sudden radio link failure, as we explained in §2. It incurs 
the RRC state change from “CONNECTED” to “IDLE,” 
and the state goes back to “CONNECTED” when a CMAS 
is received. After that, the NAS state will soon change into 
“EMM-REGISTERED.NO-CELL-AVAILABLE.”









































Figure 11. The outdoor attack simulation: (a) the satellite image of Folsom Field at the University of Colorado Boulder shows the location of 
the AT&T eNodeB. The stadium graph represents the RSRP distribution of the eNodeB measured at the center of each section, (b) When 4 × 1  
Watt malicious eNodeBs are located outside the four corners of the stadium, the simulated attack coverage hits all but one section. This 






























Figure 12. UE state transition for Secure CMAS reception.
Figure 13. The client-driven approach evaluates the security of the 
broadcast radio channel by monitoring UE’s RRC and NAS state 
transitions when a CMAS message is received. a fake CMAS message 
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which is a well-established technique for updating data on 
the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC).
To verify this scheme’s feasibility, we first stored a public 
key in a SIM card, assuming that a network operator will pro-
vision it. Then we implement the ed25519 digital signature 
for the Presidential Alert7 to sign a 4-byte time stamp along 
with the CMAS alert message (68 bytes overhead in total). 
Once a signed message is received, the alert message can be 
displayed after verifying its signature, as shown in Figure 15. As a 
result, the UE is not affected by the spoofing attack because 
it only accepts signed messages.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the WEA security vulner-
abilities over commercial LTE networks and found that 
a spoofing attack with fake alerts can be made very easily. 
Specifically, we presented our threat analysis on the spoof-
ing attack and implemented an effective attack system 
using COTS SDR hardware and open-source LTE software. 
Our extensive experimentation confirmed that the CMAS 
spoofing attack could succeed in all tested smartphones 
in the top four cellular carriers in the U.S. Further, we have 
proposed potential defenses, from which we believe that 
completely fixing this problem will require a large collab-
orative effort between carriers, government stakeholders, 
and cellphone manufacturers. 
5.2. Network-aware approach
A network-aware approach can leverage the received signal 
strength (RSS) at the UE to determine if the eNodeB from 
which the UE received the CMAS message is within a feasi-
ble distance. Using a widely used path-loss model,11 we can 
estimate the distance to the eNodeB using the RSS value. 
Then compare this with the location provided by an Internet 
database9 to determine whether the alert could have come 
from a trusted eNodeB.
The performance of this technique could be greatly 
improved by applying a machine learning (ML) as 
shown in Figure 14. In our design, we train legitimate 
cells using basic cell information, neighbor relations, 
and signal quality measurements associated with 
the location. Such information may be collected and 
shared by network operators or crowdsourcing.21 In our 
prototype, a UE retrieves an ML model associated with 
its serving and surrounding cells of its location to clas-
sify the validity of the attached eNodeB upon reception 
of a CMAS message.
5.3. Digital signature approach
We also consider digitally signing SIB12 messages to pre-
vent spoofed messages, as discussed by 3GPP.1 Although it is 
conceptually simple, adding signatures is difficult because 
operators and devices must agree on the key or keys that will 
be used to sign and validate messages.
For key management, we leverage suggestions from 3GPP 
discussions,1 which suggest using 1) the Non-Access Stratum 
(NAS) to send authenticated messages to the device, or 2) 
Over-The-Air (OTA) UE SIM card provisioning. Because NAS 
provides message integrity between the eNodeB and UE 
(mediated by pre-shared keys in the UE SIM card), messages 
received in this way cannot be spoofed by a (physically) nearby 
adversary. However, sending alerts over this channel would 
limit their reception only to devices that had established a 
NAS session. Instead, we recommend using this authenti-
cated channel to send and update a public key that a device 
should trust. This key should correspond to the private key 
held by a network operator’s Cell Broadcast Center (CBC), 
which is authorized to broadcast such alerts. Alternatively, the 


















Figure 14. The network provides a machine learning (ML)-based 
model which characterizes legitimate eNodeBs, and therefore UE 







































Figure 15. Secure CMAS delivery is guaranteed by adding a signature 
to alerts. As of May 2019, the FCC mandated to support alert 
messages up to 360 characters; adding a 64-byte digital signature 
now becomes applicable for the existing and future wireless 
emergency alert systems.
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